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ANTITRUST INTEROPERABILITY REMEDIES
Herbert Hovenkamp*

Introduction
Among the most important developments in antitrust this
decade are the competitive problems posed by large digital platforms.
The most frequently mentioned candidates are Alphabet (Google),
Amazon, Apple, and Meta (Facebook). Many others should be on this
list but have managed to avoid most of the attention. Among them are
Microsoft, which is bigger than three of the four principal targets,1 and
other two-sided digital platforms including Uber and eBay. Equally
large traditional retailers like WalMart have escaped notice as well,
even though they engage in many of the same practices. Indeed, to the
extent their customers have less mobility, the same practices are more
harmful in brick-and-mortar stores. For example, if WalMart engages
in “self-preferencing” of house brands the customer can escape only
by driving to a different store. If Amazon does the same thing the
customer can typically flee with a mouse click.
This essay sidesteps most of the interesting questions about
whether the platforms have done anything unlawful. Rather, it
assumes that they have and focuses on the appropriate remedy. One
of the most frequently mentioned remedies in the general press or

*

James G. Dinan University Professor, Univ. of Pennsylvania Carey
Law School and the Wharton School. Thanks to Alezeh Rauf and
Molly Zhang for research assistance.
1
See https://companiesmarketcap.com/ (continuously updated ranking
of firms by market cap). Among tech firms the ranking is Apple,
Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Tesla, Meta). Meta’s (Facebook’s)
position reflects a steep decline in shareholder value that occurred in
early February, 2022).
1

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4035879

2022

Antitrust Interoperability

2

occasionally by politicians or interest groups is “breakup,”2 often
given without much detail about what that entails or how it should be
accomplished. The other obvious remedies are prohibitory or
mandatory injunctions, as well as damages in cases brought by private
plaintiffs.
Compelled interoperability is also a promising remedy that can
solve many competition problems without interfering unnecessarily
with the structures that make digital platforms attractive and that have
contributed so much to economic growth. Because of the wide variety
of structures and business models for big tech, “interoperability” must
be defined broadly. It can realistically include everything from
“dynamic” interoperability that requires real time sharing of data and
operations, to “static” interoperability which requires portability but
not necessarily real time interactions. Also included are the compelled
sharing of productive assets, most frequently intellectual property
rights. The best way to think about interoperability remedies is
broadly.3 Designing such remedies requires identification of the
particular structures or practices that are making these markets less
competitive than they might be. As developed below, interoperability
is not the best remedy in all situations, nor even for all of those that
involve digital platforms.4
E.g., Senator Elizabeth Warren, “It’s Time to Break Up Amazon,
Google and Facebook “Medium (March 8, 2019).
https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-bigtech-9ad9e0da324c. See also ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, BREAK ‘EM UP:
RECOVERING OUR FREEDOM FROM BIG AG, BIG TECH, AND BIG MONEY
(2020). For a good critique, see Maham Usman, Breaking up Big
Tech: Lessons from AT&T, 170 UNIV. PA. L. REV. (2021)
(forthcoming),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3859441.
3
See, e.g., JOHN PALFREY AND URS GASSER, INTEROP: THE PROMISE
AND PERILS OF HIGHLY INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS 5 (2012) (defining
interoperability as the “ability to transfer and render useful data and
other information across systems, applications, or components.”).
4
See discussion infra, text at notes __.
2
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Approaches to antitrust remedies should begin with one
important principle, which is that a productive asset presumptively has
the size and shape that it has because of market forces, including
consumer choice. “Shape” here refers not merely to a firm’s horizontal
size, but also to the extent of its vertical integration or operations in
collateral markets.5 Simply breaking up a firm without examining the
reasons for its size and shape will do more harm than good. A
promising approach in some cases is creation of a “commons” or other
institutional mechanism that permits an asset to be shared. For
example, we might be able to keep a network intact but force
competition within it. For example, no one would advocate for a
breakup of the telephone system into discrete networks unable to
communicate with one another. Here, an interoperability decree
created the benefits of competition on a single unified network.6
The discussion here assumes that an antitrust violation has
been found. As a result, the remedy can be fashioned by a court’s
equity power in the context of litigation. Once an antitrust violation is
found the court’s equity powers are very broad, falling mainly under
the government’s broad authority to “prevent and restrain” antitrust
violations.7 In addition, Congress and perhaps even state or local
governments have the power to mandate interoperability legislatively,
without the need for proof of an antitrust violation.
Interoperability remedies are a form of injunction. They are
not structural because of themselves they do not force the divestiture,
or spin-off, of any productive asset. They do require sharing of some
information. Occasionally an interoperability remedy is also structural.
For example, the consent decree that broke up the AT&T telephone
5

GEORGE E. HALE AND ROSEMARY D. HALE, MARKET POWER: SIZE
AND SHAPE UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT (1958).
6
See discussion infra, text at notes __.
7
15 U.S.C. §25 (2018). On the scope of this power, see Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Harm and Causation, WASH. UNIV. L. REV.
(2022)
(forthcoming),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3771399.
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system in the early 1980s divided AT&T into seven regional operating
systems, separating them from AT&T’s long distance division, and
also from Western Electric, its manufacturer and supplier of
instruments.8 However, the decree also required the individual pieces
of the old Bell system to interconnect with one another as well as with
new competitors. This interconnection requirement was subsequently
enacted into the 1996 Telecommunications Act, compelling the
regional firms to interconnect with all other provides “at any
technically feasible point within the carrier’s network,”9 and providing
operational quality at least as good as that offered by the primary
carrier itself.10 Today these interconnection requirements are imposed
by the Telecom Act and not by the antitrust laws.11
In retrospect, the interoperability requirements of the AT&T
remedy were more significant and much more successful than the
structural breakups were. Many of the spun-off regional operating
systems have merged back with each other and even with AT&T.12 In
any event, it is not obvious that having multiple regional firms makes
the system work any better. Firms in different geographic markets

8

United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 141-42 & n.42 (D.D.C.
1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001
(1983).
9
47 U.S.C. §251 (c) (2)(B).
10
Id., §251 (c)(2)(C).
11
See Verizon Comm’ns v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLC, 540
U.S. 398 (2004) (declining to find an antitrust violation when the local
exchange carriers violated interconnection obligations contained in the
Telecommunications Act).
12
Bell Atlantic, NYNEX, and later GTE formed Verizon; SBC and
Pacific Telesis merged in 1997, and SBC and Ameritech in 1999; SBC
acquired AT&T; US West acquired by Qwest in 2000. See Jim Chen,
The Magnificent Seven: American Telephony’s Deregulatory
Shootout, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1503 (1999). The developments are also
recounted briefly in Bell Atlantic Corp. History, available at
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/bell-atlanticcorporation-history/.
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ordinarily do not compete much with one another.13 Interconnection,
however, is another matter. Today much of the telephone system is
highly competitive even as it is interactive. The biggest threat to it
comes from permissive merger decisions.14
In other cases, interoperability simply requires firms to share
data, operations, or some significant asset.15 The requested remedy

13

Indeed, the theory of the litigation in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007), was that, although the distinct regional operating
systems had the legal right to compete with one another, in fact they
had not done so, allegedly as a result of an anticompetitive agreement.
The Court rejected the agreement claim.
14
E.g., New York v. Deutsche-Telekom AG, 439 F.Supp.3d 179
(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (rejecting state challenge to merger of T-Mobile and
Sprint).
15

The variety of situations addressed in antitrust cases include United
States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff’d 326
U.S. 1 (1945) (requiring AP to remove bylaws that allowed its
members to block membership applications, enabling broader news
sharing among newspapers); United States v. Terminal Railroad, 224
U.S. 383 (1912) (ordering railroad terminal venture to share its
facilities); United States v. Microsoft Corp, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (effectively requiring Microsoft to permit rival internet browsers
to work on its operating system); Image Tech. v. Kodak, 125 F.3d 1195
(9th Cir. 1997) (requiring Kodak to sell aftermarket photocopier parts
to competing service providers). See also Epic Games v. Apple, 4:20cv-05640, 2021 WL 4128925 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2021) (rejecting
Epic Games’ request to abolish Apple’s restrictions on iOS app
distribution and in-app payment processing to allow for third-party app
stores on iOS); New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F.Supp.2d 76, 172
(D.D.C. 2002) (requiring Microsoft to disclose information so that
non-Windows servers could operate on Windows systems); In re Intel
Corp., 128 F.T.C. 213 (1999) (requiring Intel to share technical
information with rivals). See Spencer Weber Waller, The Past,
Present, and Future of Monopolization Remedies, 76 Antitrust L.J. 11
(2009) (arguing that information and disclosure, access and
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that the court rejected in the Epic Games antitrust case would have
required Apple to make its platform available to competing app sellers
that were not bound by Apple’s commissions.16
The domain and usefulness of interoperability remedies are
determined by considering two issues. The first is identification of the
asset for which interoperability is preferred to a breakup or other
antitrust remedy. The second concerns the administration of the
decree.
The Case for Interoperability Remedies
Interoperability remedies are worth considering when a
structural breakup will make a certain asset or plant less valuable but
competition among individual providers is desirable. In order to
achieve both of these things, an interoperability remedy preserves the
structure of physical assets but requires competition in their operation
or management. Instead of breaking up the asset we create one of two
alternatives. One is a situation in which rivals operate an asset jointly,
but in a way that incentivizes them to compete rather than collude. The
other is to mandate the sharing of data or communications in a way
that permits individually owned assets to be integrated into a single
network, whose network effects can then be aggregated over the full

interoperability should be key components of future monopolization
litigation remedies, citing Microsoft and Intel as examples).
16

Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., ___ F.Supp.3d __, 2021 WL
4128925 (N.D.Cal. Sep. 10, 2021) (refusing to find antitrust violation,
and thus rejecting requested relief that would require Apple to permit
multi-platform payment processors). See the complaint, 2020 WL
12623035 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2020), ¶16 (“But for Apple's illegal
restraints, Epic would provide a competing app store on iOS devices,
which would allow iOS users to download apps in an innovative,
curated store and would provide users the choice to use Epic's or
another third-party's in-app payment processing tool.”).
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range of users. The history of both antitrust policy17 and IP licensing
practices18 provides a wealth of instances.
Interoperability remedies are particularly attractive in two
broad but interrelated sets of cases. The first one occurs when the asset
in question is a “winner take all” market – that is, a natural monopoly
or at least something that is subject to substantial economies of scale
or scope. The second occurs when the market is subject to significant
network effects that give larger networks important advantages over
smaller ones. In both situations breakups are undesirable. They either
increase firms’ costs, make it significantly less attractive to customers
or other users, or a combination of both. To the extent that these
outcomes are undesirable they are also unstable, because future
competition will either force them to change or else drive them from
the market. For example, if output is undifferentiated a winner-takeall market has an equilibrium of one firm.19 If there are two firms in
such a market, each will be inefficiently small. Further, the larger one
will have cost advantages over the smaller one. Such markets move
naturally to either collusion or monopoly.
In order to be effective, an interoperability remedy must
decentralize control over price and output, placing them in the hand of
competitors. Some networks, such as the current phone system,
largely satisfy this requirement. Each participant sets its own price,
but they cannot lawfully collaborate on a price for the network itself.
Price fixing is a problem to be watched, but as long as sellers’ prices

17

Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, 130 YALE
L.J. at 1952, 2021-2031 (2021).
18
See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION
WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN
INNOVATION 325-364 (2012).
19
See Paul L. Joskow, Regulation of Natural Monopoly, Ch., 16, pp.
1227-1348, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, eds., 2007).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4035879

2022

Antitrust Interoperability

8

are individually set the incentive is not obviously greater than it is in
any market.
Some networks are dominated, in the sense that a single firm
owns or operates it and everyone else is a mere licensee or customer.
This can lead to serious problems, as the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc.20 illustrates. The
networks in that case were privately operated airline scheduling
systems that made reservations for numerous airlines. American
Airlines operated SABRE, the largest system. United Airlines
operated Apollo, which was smaller.21 While these systems were
networks, they were “dominated” networks in the sense that for each
of them a single large firm owned the network and made all of the
relevant decisions about network access and pricing, although no one
alleged that the system set the ticket prices of the airlines themselves.
The other airlines were licensees rather than managing participants.
Alaska Airlines and other smaller carriers brought an antitrust action
against the systems, claiming discrimination and exclusion. In
rejecting that claim the Ninth Circuit contrasted the case with the
Supreme Court’s Terminal Railroad decision, noting that the railroad
terminal network in that case had been controlled by a collaboration of
multiple firms. In the present case, by contrast, SABRE and Apollo
were controlled by a single firm. As a result, the unilateral refusal to
deal standard of §2 of the Sherman Act applied. Under it, the duty to
deal is very narrow.22
The Supreme Court’s 1912 decision in United States v.
Terminal Railroad Association, which the Alaska Airlines decision
20

948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 538.
22
Id. at 542, citing Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in
Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1990). The court
also dismissed as irrelevant antitrust cases requiring dealing in
regulated industries, such as Otter Rail Power Co. v. United States, 410
U.S. 366 (1973); and MCI Communications Co. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d
1081 (9th Cir. 1983).
21
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distinguished, came in an action brought by the government against a
corporation controlled by a group of market participants, including
railroads, bridges across the Mississippi River, and various loading
and cargo storage and transfer facilities.23 The Association was a
holding company, formed by purchasing the shares or in a few cases
the assets of these various entities.24 The resulting network of facilities
was a bottleneck through which east-west traffic at that point of the
Mississippi River had to pass. While 24 railroads converged on the
Mississippi River at Saint Louis, none passed across. Roughly half
were on the west and the others on the east.25 The association’s intent
was apparently to use that network to create a monopoly of traffic
passing across the river.
Having found a Sherman Act violation, the Court approved an
order requiring the operators of the association to act as an “impartial
agent” for every railroad line that was compelled to use the facilities.26
Under that decree the defendant was required to approve the admission
to the venture “of any existing or future railroad to joint ownership and
control of the combined terminal properties” so as to place it “upon a
plane of equality” with the original venture participants. In addition,
if an outsider railroad preferred not to become a member, the defendant
association was required to permit it to use the facilities “upon such
just and reasonable terms and regulations” as would place it “upon as
nearly an equal plane as may be with respect to expenses and charges
as that occupied by the proprietary companies.”27 Further, if any
dispute about participation among the parties or with outsiders should
arise, they would be referred to the federal district court.28 The Court

23

United States v. Terminal R.R. Assn. of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383
(1912).
24
See Id. at 393-394 (describing many of the stock and asset
transactions).
25
Id. at 395.
26
Id. at 410.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.:
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did not order a breakup of the company, but did require that if the
parties were unable to come to agreements in accordance with the
decree the Court would consider a plan of dissolution.29
In contrast to the Terminal Railroad case, the Alaska Airlines
decision gives us the worst of two worlds. First, as networks of
multiple airlines, the reservation systems had whatever market power
an aggregation of providers might acquire. For many networks this
could be the entire market. Second, because the networks were
controlled by a single firm, prices and terms were set unilaterally and
thus were not reachable under the more aggressive price fixing and
exclusionary practice provisions of §1 of the Sherman Act.
By holding up Terminal Railroad as a counterexample, the
court was in fact making an important suggestion about effective
remedies: networks of active market participants can be made to
operate more competitively if decision making power is distributed
over all or at least a significant subset of participants. A well designed
interoperability remedy will enable a market to take full advantage of
the economies that a particular asset’s size and shape provide, while
yet inducing competition within the network. SABRE could just as
easily have been organized as a cooperative venture among the
participating airlines.
Costs that decline as output increases can often serve to make
breakups undesirable. Once the firm is broken into two or more pieces
each will have higher costs. Further, if these economies of scale are
substantial the resulting breakup will not be stable. Eventually one
firm will come to dominate over the others and the market will once
Sixth. By providing that any disagreement between any
company applying to become a joint owner or user, as herein
provided for, and the terminal or proprietary companies, which
shall arise after a final decree in this cause, may be submitted
to the district court, upon a petition filed in this cause, subject
to review by appeal in the usual manner.
29
Id. at 412.
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again return to monopoly status, perhaps through bankruptcy, perhaps
by merger, or perhaps by collusion.30
To illustrate, suppose that a firm’s costs decline as output
decreases up to the point that it produces 100 units at a cost of $1. For
any smaller output costs would be proportionately higher. Further,
total market demand at a price of $1 or a little higher is 90 units. That
indicates that this firm is a natural monopoly, or “winner-take-all”
market. Left to its own choices it would maximize its profits by
reducing output to some lower level, say, 70 units, and charging a
higher price, say $1.60. If a structural antitrust decree broke this firm
into two halves, however, its costs would be significantly higher. The
firm’s post-breakup “competitive” price might very well be higher and
output lower than its pre-breakup “monopoly” price. In that case, not
only will consumers and input suppliers such as labor be harmed, but
the situation will not be sustainable in the long run.
Suppose, however, that this particular asset could be shared
among several firms who could aggregate its scale economies by
operating it jointly. That is, the system would retain its dominant
structure but be operated competitively by a large number of firms. If
these firms behaved competitively, they would share this facility and
compete all the way up to the point that the plant’s capacity was
exhausted or the market saturated. Indeed, that structure could yield
the optimal regulatory goal of performance that mimics a competitive
market but in the context of a monopoly asset. The structure would be
preferable to the one that Harold Demsetz famously proposed, which
was that multiple firms bid against each other to operate a natural
monopoly utility.31 In Demsetz’ model a single winning bidder won
the right to operate the utility by bidding the competitive price. By
contrast, under the interoperability approach a number of firms operate
the asset jointly, and the antitrust laws govern their pricing and output
30

See Joskow, supra note __.
Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J. L. & ECON. 55
(1968).
31
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selection behavior, as in the phone system. How often such an
outcome is realistically available is yet to be determined, but it
certainly could be generated much more frequently than it is currently.
The important underlying principle is that economies of scale,
or the extreme situation of winner-take-all status, are things that attach
to productive assets, not to firms as such. So the antitrust trick is to
compel the existence of multiple participating firms, not to create
multiple competing assets.
The problem of network effects is closely related to natural
monopoly, but where the economies of scale attach to consumption
rather than production. The network is more valuable as it has more
users. If a network is subject to “indirect” network effects as well, it
becomes more valuable to one side as it has more participants on the
other side, and vice-versa. For example, Uber becomes more valuable
as it has more drivers providing rides, but it will obtain more drivers
by having more passengers. As a result, growth on the two sides is
mutually supporting and gives a larger network a distinct advantage
over a smaller one. The same thing is true of Facebook and other social
networking sites. The gold standard in networks is the global
telephone system in which nearly everyone can talk to nearly everyone
else. Any “breakup” that created two or more networks such that
members of one network could not communicate with members of the
other would be much less valuable. In such cases simply breaking up
the network can pose debilitating social costs, perhaps even making
the network nonviable. In sum, what the telephone system needed for
effective competition was multiple firms acting as decision makers,
not multiple networks, and very likely not Demsetz’ idea that multiple
firms should bid against one another for sole control of the network.
That was the genius of the antitrust consent decree that restructured the
telephone industry.
Networks can often be shared in ways that brick-and-mortar
plants and stores cannot because the digital conduits that bind the
members together leave room for much greater operational flexibility.
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Once again, the telephone network offers an example where literally
thousands of firms can participate, offering telecommunications
services of various sorts, devices, and collateral services, but all on an
interconnected network. So the real question is whether the experience
of the telephone network can be duplicated in other settings. The
answer is maybe, and perhaps often, although some creative variations
will have to be tried.
Often the historical development of a network explains why it
is dominant or collaborative. The original telephone system emanated
from a single dominant firm, AT&T.32 By contrast, the Chicago Board
of Trade,33 which was a marketing commons, and the Associated
Press,34 a news sharing wire service of newspapers, were structured
from the beginning as collaborations of multiple firms. In general, if
a market has a dominant firm at the time of a network’s formation that
firm will prefer a dominated network, as AT&T did prior to the
breakup. If it does not, then the network that emerges is more likely
to be collaborative.35 For example, the Windows operating system
emerged as dominant within Intel-based small computer systems
because it was pioneered by a single firm. The Government’s antitrust
case was provoked by Microsoft’s efforts to exclude an unruly web
browser, Netscape, that threatened to “commoditize” the operating

32

On the history of the Bell AT&T system and how it related to its
competitors and other networks, see RICHARD R. JOHN, NETWORK
NATION: INVENTING AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2010)
33
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918)
(upholding as reasonable a price agreement among the trading
members of an incorporated market in grains and agricultural
products).
34
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (striking down
discriminatory membership rule imposed by association of
newspapers formed to facilitate wire service news sharing).
35
See Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities,
Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM.ECON. REV. 424 (1985).
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system by making the browser compatible across multiple platforms.36
By contrast, email is just as networked, but it emerged as a
collaborative network whose interconnectivity rivals that of the
telephone system. Although there are hundreds of email clients, or
providers, all of them operate on a system under which anyone who
owns an address provided by one client can readily communicate with
those using a different client.37
Designing Interoperability Decrees
Once an antitrust violation has been proven, the first step in
fashioning a remedy is determining the best type, and thus whether an
interoperability remedy is even appropriate. “Winner take all” status is
important, but it is not necessarily the driving factor. Most assets,
including most digital platforms, are not winner-take-all. In most of
these, competition is feasible without interoperability.
The principal reason that even platforms with significant
network effects are not winner-take-all markets is product
differentiation. For example, the United States has hundreds of dating
sites and thousands of internet-based subscription periodicals,38 most
of which operate on two-sided platform networks. The competition
results from differentiated products that compete on elements other
than price. Each dating site or magazine offers a distinctive variation
36

See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1998 WL 614485 (D.D.C. Sep.
14, 1998) (denying Microsoft’s motion for summary judgment on
federal antitrust claims) at *4 (describing Bill Gates fear that the
Netscape/Java combination threatened to “commoditize” the operating
system). The monopolization claims were resolved by the court of
appeals in United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C.Cir.
2001).
37
See John Palfrey and Urs Gasser, Interoperability in Information and
Information Systems in the Furtherance of Trade (NCCR Trade
Regulation
Working
Paper,
2014),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2192651.
38
For example, Zinio, a seller of digital magazines, lists more than
6000 digital magazines published worldwide. See Zinio.com.
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of its particular product.39 Very likely the world will always
accommodate multiple social networking products including
Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, TikTok, Reddit, Snapchat, LinkedIn,
and others. While all of these benefit from network externalities and
thus larger size, they are significantly different from one another and
appeal to different audiences. The fact that most of them are free to
users serves to enhance the extent of nonprice competition, because
price is not a factor. Size certainly confers network advantages, but in
differentiated markets there is almost always room for unique
alternatives.
As a result, broad and mandated interoperability is not always
the best remedy, even for digital two-sided platforms. It would not
obviously be helpful for a nondominant dating site such as Zoosk.40
Nor would increase competition among the thousands of magazines
and newspapers that publish on digital platforms. In these cases
product variety and robust ongoing entry41 suggest that competition is
working quite well. In markets that exhibit significant differentiation
but that do have dominant firms, the principal thing impeding new
competition is overly lax enforcement of the law against acquisitions
or unreasonably exclusionary contract practices.
The fact that Facebook is not necessarily a winner-take-all
network does not fully resolve the remedies issue. Indeed, if a network
really is winner-take-all, then it would not need exclusionary practices
in order to maintain its position. Once it had attained a dominant
position it could retain it by simply operating efficiently without
significant missteps. Its advantages in structure and membership size
would be sufficient to exclude competing firms. On the other hand,
networks that are not winner-take-all can maintain dominance only by

39

See Hovenkamp, Platform Monopoly, supra note __ at 1996-2001.
Zoosk.com.
41
Statista data show that 60 new magazines entered the U.S. market in
2020.
See https://www.statista.com/statistics/238598/magazinelaunches-in-the-united-states-by-category/.
40
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engaging in exclusionary practices. Facebook’s need to acquire
Instagram illustrates the problem. Facebook very likely could not keep
Instagram out of the market simply by offering its own services on
attractive but sustainable terms.42
When a market does contain a dominant firm, however,
interoperability as an antitrust remedy can be a way to undo the effects
of exclusionary practices, including anticompetitive acquisitions. It is
intended to restore competition, which is generally a central goal of an
antitrust equity remedy, particularly those that reach beyond a simple
injunction.43
Merger policy today has become focused mainly on collusion
or collusion-like behavior rather than exclusion. The fear is that the
merger will lead to either a market-wide price increase44 or else a
“unilateral” price increase imposed by the merging firms.45 Platform
acquisitions of upstart rivals need to be addressed more broadly as
exclusionary practices, designed to prevent new competition from
emerging. The FTC’s complaint against Facebook’s acquisition of
Instagram makes clear that the FTC has gotten this message. At the
time of that acquisition Facebook was obsessed with the possibilities
that Instagram would turn into a significant rival – a telling indicator
that Facebook is not a winner-take-all platform.46 But the Instagram
See the summary of the FTC’s First Amended Complaint, infra note
__.
43
E.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 47 (D.C.Cir.
2001) (noting government’s request for remedy that would “restore
competitive conditions”); Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 462
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (remedy extending beyond an injunction required
“stronger proof” that it was necessary to “restore competitive
conditions”).
44
See United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines §7 (coordinated effects),
available at Horizontal Merger Guidelines (08/19/2010) (justice.gov).
45
Id, §6 (unilateral effects).
46
First Amended Complaint, FTC v. Facebook, Inc., #1:20-cv-3590JEB (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2021). See ¶¶1,7, 64 (strategy of preferring
42
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case is easy and obvious, particularly in light of several years of
hindsight showing that Instagram really did emerge as a significant
platform, with about one billion users today.47 At the time of the
acquisition it had about 30 million users and a “handful” of employees,
although it was growing rapidly.48
Many firms acquired by large digital platforms today are very
small, but their systematic acquisition means that those which might
have emerged as formidable rivals never will.49 Evaluating dominant
platform acquisitions of nascent rivals should be considered a form of
risk management rather than an effort to preclude immediate
competitive losses. That would require changing proof burdens to as
to disfavor the acquisitions and, where possible, limit them to IP
acquisitions of nonexclusive rights.50 Presumptively there are very
likely few situations in which a large multi-offering platform cannot
get everything it needs from an acquisition through non-exclusive IP
licensing.

acquisition of rivals; ¶¶66, 72 (acquisition strategy vis-à-vis
Instagram); ¶¶82-84, 88-90 (Zuckerberg’s anxiety about Instagram’s
rapid growth); ¶86 (acquisition motivated by fear that Apple might
otherwise acquire Instagram).
47
See https://backlinko.com/instagram-users (early 2022 estimate).
48
See “Facebook Buys Instagram for $1 Billion,” NEW YORK TIMES
(April 9, 2012), available at
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/09/facebook-buys-instagramfor-1-billion/.
49
Wikipedia maintains updated lists of the firms acquired by each of
the dominant platforms. See, e.g., “List of Mergers and Acquisitions
by Meta Platforms,” WIKIPEDIA, at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_mergers_and_acquisitions_by_
Meta_Platforms (showing 92 acquisitions by Meta alone) (last visited
Feb 12, 2022).
50
See Kevin A. Bryan & Erik Hovenkamp, Antitrust Limits on Startup
Acquisitions, 56 REV. INDUS. ORG. 615 (2020); Kevin A. Bryan & Erik
Hovenkamp, Startup Acquisitions, Error Costs, and Antitrust Policy,
87 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 331 (2020).
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Further, “dynamic” interoperability is likely to be an unwieldy
solution to a monopoly problem such as the one presented by
Facebook. Making data fully interactive in real time could be difficult,
given that these sites use different types of data and in different ways.
Making such a remedy work is fundamentally an engineering question.
“Static’ interoperability, or portability, is more promising. In
its opinion sustaining the FTC’s monopolization complaint against
Facebook, the court cited lack of data portability as a barrier to entry,
which it clearly is.51 As a Facebook user builds up an inventory of
messages, photos, videos, contacts, and other content the cost of
switching to a different provider is higher. One way to remedy this
problem is to require Facebook to keep this data in an accessible
format, comprising a package that could be claimed by its owner and
transferred to other firms who have set themselves up to take
advantage of it. Without a locked-in membership Facebook could be
forced to compete more aggressively to hold users’ attention. Such a
remedy should begin with the premise that the user should have the
power to access and transfer his or her own data.

51

FTC v. Facebook, Inc., __ F.Supp.3d __, 2022 WL 103308 (D.D.C.
Jan. 11, 2022) (summarizing First Amended Complaint as alleging
that:
… Facebook executives recognized that “one of the most
important ways we can make switching costs very high for
users - if we are where all users’ photos reside[, it] will be very
tough for a user to switch if they can't take those photos and
associated data/comments with them.” [citing FAC, ¶ 216.]
The FTC also notes that “these switching costs can increase
over time — a ‘ratchet effect’ — as each user's collection of
content and connections, and investment of effort in building
each, continually builds with use of the service.” Id., ¶ 213.
Finally, it alleges that Facebook was also well aware of this
dynamic, with “a Facebook ordinary course document not[ing]
that there are ‘many lines of evidence for a substantial ratchet
effect’ and that ratchet effects ‘can confer [a] permanent
advantage.’ ” Id.
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Amazon presents its own unique problems. Unlike Meta
(Facebook) or Alphabet (Google), much of what Amazon sells is nondigital tactile products. Further, Amazon has evolved into what is
effectively a multi-seller marketplace. In fact, the proportion of its
sales that represent third parties has risen dramatically and now
constitutes more than 55% of its business.52 Nevertheless, for antitrust
purposes Amazon is treated as a single entity. That is, its situation
resembles the major airlines in the computer reservation system
decision described previously,53 rather than the one in the Terminal
Railroad case.54
The multi-firm operating structure in the Terminal Railroad
case had been created voluntarily by the parties prior to the
government’s suit. There is no good reason that it could not be created
by a judicial decree, should a suitable antitrust violation be found. This
would require an operational structure in which effective decision
making about product selection, pricing and other terms was made by
a collaboration of market participants rather than Amazon itself. That
could enable Amazon to preserve the advantage that its large platform
size gives it, while facilitating internal competition. This would not
require a breakup but rather a transfer of decision making authority
over product selection, pricing, and related practices to a board of
individual partipants in the Amazon marketplace. Treating Amazon’s
conduct as collaborative rather than unilateral would discipline
anticompetitive practices without getting courts involved in
presumptively unilateral decision-making about Amazon’s product
selection process, how it arranges products on Amazon searches, and
the like Further a horizontal agreement among multiple firms to

52

See
https://www.statista.com/statistics/259782/third-party-sellershare-of-amazon-platform/ (showing increase of paid units sold by
third parties on Amazon, rising to 57% in Q42021) (last visited Feb.
15, 2022).
53
See discussion supra, text at notes __.
54
See discussion supra, text at notes __.
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engage in a restraint such as a most-favored-nation clause would get
much harsher treatment than would purely vertical agreements.55
Interoperability decrees can be particularly effective as part of
merger remedies, and may be necessary to preserve the viability of
spun-off assets. For example, if Facebook should be ordered to spin
off Instagram, as the FTC is requesting, data portability between the
two could give Instagram a fair chance at competing successfully,
assuming that it needs one. In fact, remedies involving IP sharing are
well established in merger enforcement.56
What would be more unusual would be an order that forced
Facebook to share this data with everyone as a remedy for a specific
merger with a single firm. In its Facebook decision the court accepted
the FTC’s allegation that the high switching costs resulting from
Facebook’s lock on each user’s accumulated data be treated as a barrier
to entry, not as a unique problem related to a particular merger. That
seems correct, but one important thing about entry barriers is that when
they operate at all they operate against everyone, including both
established potential rivals and even firms that are not yet in existence.
In that case it seems quite appropriate that an interoperability order run
not merely in favor of Instagram, but also for all actual and potential
rivals that might be in a position to take advantage of it. While this
55

Such remedies are explored in more detail in Hovenkamp, Platform
Monopoly, supra note __, 2021-2031.
56
See ANTITRUST DIVISION, USDOJ, MERGER REMEDIES MANUAL
(Sep. 2020), available at Justice Department Issues Modernized
Merger Remedies Manual | OPA | Department of Justice. See id. at 6,
noting that the divested firm must be given all assets required to be an
effective long-term competitor. See also id. at 7:
In markets where an installed base of customers is required
in order to operate at an effective scale, the divested assets
should either convey an installed base of customers to the
purchaser or quickly enable the purchaser to obtain an
installed customer base.
Further, this may require compulsory licensing of IP rights. Id., citing
United States v. Nat’l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 348 (1947).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4035879

2022

Antitrust Interoperability

21

might seem like overreaching when given as a remedy for a particular
merger, it is clearly not when used as a remedy for monopolization,
which is concerned with general market dominance.
Lest such decrees seem excessively regulatory, particularly
given the conservative tilt of the current Supreme Court, one should
look at the decree that the Court approved in NCAA v. Alston.57 While
the NCAA is an elaborate networked market, the Alston decision did
not govern network operations. Rather it involved the rules that the
NCAA made collaboratively among its members to place limits on the
compensation of student athletes. The decree was complex, covering
a variety of forms that athlete compensation could take.58 The Court
observed that as of the time of its opinion the district court’s decree
seemed to be working quite well, without excessive court
intervention.59
To be sure, we may be understating the difficulty of
administering complex interoperability decrees. Michael Kades and
Fiona Scott Morton are sufficiently pessimistic that they advocate
formation of a technical committee overseen by antitrust enforcers to
adopt workable interconnection standards.60 That seems premature, at
least at a time when we do not have a great deal of experience with
enforced as opposed to voluntary interoperability. Disputes will
certainly arise over issues related to the scope, terms, or prices of
sharing. But ordinary bargaining relationships, including arbitration
57

141 S.Ct. 2141 (2021).
The decree is analyzed in Herbert Hovenkamp, A Miser’s Rule of
Reason: Student Athlete Compensation and the Alston Antitrust Case,
ARIZ.
L.
REV.
(2022)
(forthcoming),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3879580.
59
Id. at 2163-2165.
60
Michael Kades and Fiona Scott Morton, Interoperability as a
Competition Remedy for Digital Networks 3 (Washington Center for
Equitable
Growth,
Sep.,
2020),
available
at
https://equitablegrowth.org/working-papers/interoperability-as-acompetition-remedy-for-digital-networks/.
58
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or district court intervention in the case of impasse, would be less
intrusive. Both the elaborate interconnection agreements contemplated
by the 1996 Telecommunications Act and the provisions for FRAND
licensing of standard essential patents operate in this fashion. They
contemplate private negotiation with judicial intervention only when
needed. Another less costly possibility is Agency Guidelines. It bears
emphasis, however, that interoperability remedies will require a
significant amount of distinct treatment in different industries and even
for different individual firms.
As noted previously, if a platform is truly winner-take-all, then
the firm who controls it does not need exclusionary practices in order
to remain dominant. That does not necessarily mean that it will not
use them. Once again, AT&T is an important example of a firm that
traditionally was thought to be a natural monopoly, but whose position
was challenged by the emergence of wireless technologies.61 It was
actually condemned for unlawful refusals to deal,62 which are
idiosyncratic because the only violation is the refusal to share the
facility. Today it is doubtful that refusal to deal law would reach that
far.63 If it does not and if the firm avoids other unlawful practices, then
a legislative solution may be what is required.
While imposed interoperability or restructuring of
management are aggressive remedies, it bears emphasize that under
current antitrust law they could be imposed by judicial decree only
after an antitrust violation has been found. At that point, while the
antitrust court’s equity powers are broad, the question of prudence
remains. For simple anticompetitive contracts or other discrete
61

See discussion supra, text at notes __.
MCI Communications Co. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-1134 (9th
Cir. 1983) (AT&T’s refusal to permit MCI to interconnect violated
antitrust essential facility doctrine).
63
Verizon Comm’ns v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLC, 540
U.S. 398 (2004) (Verizon’s disobedience of Communications Act’s
interconnection requirements not an antitrust violation, although not
explicitly overruling MCI).
62
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behaviors, a simple injunction may be the most effective and the least
disruptive. When such remedies are inadequate, however, proposed
relief needs to be tested against the requirement that it can reasonably
be expected to restore competitive conditions.
Conclusion
Unlike the courts, Congress has the power to impose
interoperability remedies without any finding of an antitrust violation.
Whether it should do so is, at this stage, doubtful. Other than the
AT&T consent decree, the courts have had little experience in
developing and overseeing such remedies.
More important, interoperability is a two-sided coin. One of
the great values of competition, and of digital competition in
particular, is its diversity. Excessive interoperability may simply serve
to homogenize a market by reducing the distinctiveness of individual
offerings. When choice is realistically available, effective choice is
the best remedy. This militates in favor of “static” interoperability, or
data portability, in a case such as Facebook. It also suggests that a firm
such as Amazon – in the case of a proven §2 violation – would best be
dealt with by making its management more competitive rather than
using legislation or the courts to micromanage its product choices.
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